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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is designed to streamline the
litigation process in the federal court system by imposing sanctions on
those who submit frivolous pleadings, motions, or other papers.' The
Rule authorizes sanctions for three types of frivolous claims: (1) claims
that have an insufficient legal basis; (2) claims that are brought for an
improper purpose; and (3) claims that have an insufficient factual
basis.2
The advisory committee's notes suggest that courts may sanction
attorneys, clients, or both for Rule 11 violations.3 Because the law is the
lawyer's domain, courts usually have imposed sanctions for claims with
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments. The full text of the
Rule is as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading,
motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise specifically pro-
vided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule
in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of
two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called
to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may in-
clude an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments (noting that the
Rule expands upon the equitable doctrine permitting the court to award expenses and attorney's
fees to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith, and also noting that the Rule requires a prefil-
ing inquiry into both factual and legal elements of the claim).
3. Id.
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insufficient legal basis on the filing attorney.4 Courts have imposed
sanctions for claims brought for an improper purpose-bad faith
claims-on the individuals who acted in bad faith, be they attorneys,
clients, or both.5 When claims have an insufficient factual basis courts
have imposed sanctions on the attorney alone or on the attorney and
client together.'
Courts have developed a system for allocating the sanctions they
impose for claims with an insufficient factual basis. Once a court con-
cludes that a claim lacks a sufficient factual basis, it must determine
who, if anyone, is to blame for the improper filing.1 To determine
whether to sanction an attorney for failure to undertake an adequate
factual investigation, courts must ascertain whether the prefiling in-
quiry was reasonable under the circumstances.' This objective standard
imposes sanctions against attorneys who have failed to make a reasona-
ble prefiling factual investigation, even if they filed in good faith.9 The
objective standard also applies to pro se litigants.10
The standard applicable to clients who are represented by counsel
in inadequate factual investigation cases has been less clear. Some
courts have considered an empty head and a pure heart a valid excuse,
refusing to sanction clients who made frivolous claims without knowl-
edge of the factual deficiency.11 Other courts, applying an objective test,
have sanctioned clients who made claims in good faith.12
The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Business Guides, Inc.
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.,13 holding that Rule 11
provides a single objective standard that applies to both attorneys and
4. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1988).
5. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir.
1977) (imposing sanctions on an attorney only); Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (imposing sanctions on a client only); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (imposing sanctions on an attorney and a client).
6. See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (imposing sanc-
tions on an attorney only); Portnoy v. Wherehouse Entertainment Co., 120 F.R.D. 73 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (imposing sanctions on both an attorney and a client).
7. See, e.g., CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 739 F. Supp. 966 (E.D.
Pa. 1990).
8. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1989).
9. Id. For attorneys, "an empty head and a pure heart is no excuse." See Note, The In-
tended Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An End to the "Empty Head, Pure
Heart" Defense and a Reinforcement of Ethical Standards, 41 VAIM. L. REv. 343 (1988).
10. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 892 F.2d 802, 811 (9th
Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) (adopt-
ing a subjective standard), rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Business Guides, 892 F.2d 802 (adopting an objective standard).
13. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
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clients. Under Business Guides, clients represented by counsel have a
duty to make a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts of their claims
and are subject to sanctions should they neglect this duty. 4 Although
the decision specifically referred to represented parties whose signa-
tures appear on their filings, courts likely will apply the same objective
standard to clients who have not actually signed their filings.15
This Note examines the duty Rule 11 creates and its allocation be-
tween attorneys and their clients from an economic perspective. Part II
examines Rule 11's historical purpose of deterring frivolous claims and
traces the roots of the duty the Rule imposes on attorneys to achieve
this purpose. Part III discusses how Rule 11 ideally should function in a
society with perfect information about the cost of frivolous claims to
the judicial system compared to the cost of deterring such claims, and
determines that an optimal Rule would minimize the sum of these
costs. Given the information constraints of the real world, Part III con-
cludes that the Rule can come closest to achieving the goal of cost mini-
mization by placing the duty to investigate the facts of a claim on the
party that can best minimize costs-in economic terms, the "cheapest
cost avoider."
Part IV employs an example to illustrate that the cheapest cost
avoider varies from case to case and that too strict an application of the
objective standard falls to minimize costs because it often places the
primary duty to investigate on clients who are not the cheapest cost
avoiders. Part V examines the possibility of shifting the duty to investi-
gate factual claims from the client to the attorney through indemnifica-
tion agreements and concludes that such attorney-client bargaining
generally will not be effective in minimizing costs.
Part VI proposes several indicators of client sophistication that will
help courts to identify the cheapest cost avoider in a given case. Be-
cause in many cases, however, a client will be neither clearly sophisti-
cated nor clearly unsophisticated, Part VII suggests that courts adopt a
hybrid approach and impose a duty to investigate at the level of a rea-
sonable person in the client's position who knows that bringing a frivo-
lous claim could result in personal liability.
14. Id. at 933. A represented client's duty under the objective standard of factual inquiry is
similar to the duty of care created by tort law. Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 418
(7th Cir. 1988).
15. See 111 S. Ct. at 941 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also FED. IL Civ. P. 11 advisory com-
mittee's notes to the 1983 amendments (suggesting that it may be appropriate to sanction a non-
signing client).
[Vol. 44:1165
19911 CLIENT'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 1169
II. THE HISTORY OF RULE 11-DETERRENCE As PRIMARY PURPOSE
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is intended to com-
bat the delay and high cost associated with modern litigation by deter-
ring frivolous pleadings."8 Essentially, the Rule creates a tort of abuse
of process,17 imposing sanctions on those who breach their duty to the
legal system.'8 In attempting to define what duty of factual investiga-
tion Rule 11 imposes on clients represented by counsel, one must ex-
amine the deterrent purpose of the Rule and the historical derivation of
that duty.
A. The Need to Deter Frivolous Pleadings
A fundamental principle of our system of justice is that every citi-
zen should have access to the courts to resolve disputes and enforce
rights.'9 Judicial resources are limited, however, and the courts cannot
offer immediate access to all citizens at once.20 Some delay is inherent
in the litigation process.' When the delay associated with resolving a
dispute in court becomes too great, the courts are unable to perform
their function,2 2 and the public loses confidence in the judicial pro-
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments; see also Carter,
The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4, 4 (1985).
17. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 941
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "[tihe Rule creates duties to [an attorney's] adversary and to the legal system, just as
tort law creates duties to [an attorney's] client").
19. See, e.g., Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1,,8
(1984) (discussing easy access procedures that "reflect the desire to provide all citizens with the
right to a day in court" and the "propaganda, which literally beckons potential litigants with sweet
talk of 'equal access to justice' ").
20. The rate of appointment of additional judges could never match the demand for the
services of the judicial system. Id. at 12. "America has a staggering profusion of courts.. . . Staff-
ing the benches of these various tribunals, even at existing levels, consumes a substantial portion
of the pool of highly competent lawyers who are politically acceptable and willing to be distracted
from the more lucrative arena of private practice." Id.
21. Many courts are facing backlogs as long as four or five years. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE &
A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.1, at 452 (1988). The most frequently mentioned reason for delay
in the resolution of cases is the sheer volume of cases brought, often described as the "litigation
explosion." See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 2-3. Prior to the tremendous increase in litigation in
the last 30 years, id., the delays related primarily to cases awaiting trial by jury. J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra, § 10.1, at 452.
A certain amount of delay may be desirable because it encourages parties to settle disputes on
their own without going to court and exacerbating the overcrowding problem. See, e.g., Galanter,
The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 8 & nn.20-22 (suggesting that the
portion of cases that have been settled prior to trial or soon after trial begins has increased as the
amount of litigation in the court system has increased).
22. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 29 (suggesting that "[i]f conditions continue to deterio-
rate, we might as well chisel off the legend above the Supreme Court's door, 'Equal Justice Under
Law,' and replace it with a sign that says, 'Closed-No Just, Speedy, or Inexpensive Adjudication
for Anyone' ").
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cess.2S Lack of confidence in the system and the rule of law may result
in increased lawlessness.2 4
By the 1980s the United States faced a "litigation explosion"
brought on by a number of factors peculiar to our society and our judi-
cial philosophy.2 5 This country had the highest litigation rate and the
most lawyers per capita in the world. 6 Moreover, the "American Rule"
that requires each party to a lawsuit to pay its own costs, 27 the allow-
ance of contingent fee arrangements, the provision in many statutes
for court-awarded attorney's fees, 29 and the tax deductibility of litiga-
tion expenses, 0 all provided economic incentives to litigate. The earlier
proliferation of federal substantive rights, particularly the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 196431 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,32
opened the courts to a great number of citizens." Finally, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure encouraged litigation through a procedural
system that allowed ready access to the courts through the "notice
-pleading" provisions, 4 liberal amendment provisions, 5 and expansive
23. See, e.g., id. at 36 (discussing signs of growing alienation with the system).
24. Id. (noting that many see the courthouse as a place to resolve disputes in a "violence-free
atmosphere," and that "a breakdown in the public's confidence in the judicial system or the devel-
opment of a widespread conception of its being paleolithic in character could be catastrophic"); see
also THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 300 (A.L. Levin & R.
Wheeler eds. 1979) (observing that "[s]tatutory rights become empty promises if adjudication is
too long delayed to make them meaningful or the value of a claim is consumed by the expense of
asserting it"); Miller, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that "[iut is axiomatic that justice delayed is
justice denied").
25. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 5A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D §
1331, at 13 (discussing causes of the "litigation explosion"); see also Galanter, supra note 21, at 3-5
(discussing concern over increasing litigation). Galanter argues, however, that there are substantial
benefits to America's "hyperlexis" and that there is no crisis. Id. at 37-39.
26. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, at 13 & n.18.
27. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). In most other
countries, including Great Britain, litigants who are defeated in court must bear their opponent's
expenses. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, § 1331, at 13. For a discussion of the history and
purpose of the American rule, see Note, supra note 9, at 347-48.
28. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, § 1331, at 13-14. The contingent fee arrangement
allows many litigants who cannot afford to pay regular hourly rates to bring claims by agreeing to
pay their attorneys a percentage of any award made. This practice has resulted in parties filing
many claims that they otherwise would not have filed. Id.
29. Id. at § 1331, at 14 (stating that "[tihe availability of statutory fee awards has made
claims with little or no prospect of a significant monetary award for the plaintiff attractive to
lawyers, who in the past could not have afforded to take such cases, especially on a contingent
basis").
30. Id. at § 1331, at 14 n.23 (stating that in effect the tax system subsidizes lawsuits by
permitting taxpayers to deduct litigation expenses in some contexts).
31. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
32. Pub. L. No 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). -
33. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, § 1331, at 15.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring only a "short and plain statement" of the claim). This stan-
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discovery rules.s6 Ironically, policy choices designed to make the federal
courts more accessible to aggrieved parties may have increased
caseloads, thereby worsening the delay associated with litigation.
With such a large number of legitimate cases awaiting trial on
United States dockets, s7 courts needed to minimize the time taken by
frivolous lawsuits.38 While there is no empirical data on the -number of
frivolous lawsuits filed, frivolous litigation clearly posed a major prob-
lem in the early 1980s. s1 The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were made
with an eye toward deterring frivolous litigation.40
B. The History of the Duty Imposed by Rule 11
Because our legal system is adversarial rather than inquisitorial,4 '
courts decide cases and make laws based on the issues raised by the
parties to the case.,2 As officers of the court, lawyers in this system
dard requires only that the opposing party and the court be able to obtain a basic understanding
of the claim. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 5.7, at 254.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (providing that parties may make one amendment as a matter of course
and further amendments by written consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, which shall
be given freely when justice so requires).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (allowing parties to obtain admissible evidence after they are through
the door of the court); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 7.1, at 381.
37. The problem has not abated. In 1990 there were 211,626 civil cases filed in the district
courts. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STA-
TISTCS 3 (Dec. 31, 1990).
38. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.BA. J. 274, 275 (1982) (address by
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the American Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1982)); Note, Insuring
Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 344, 375 (1989) (noting that "[iun an already overburdened
system, frivolous filings and motions make an already lengthy process lengthier").
A suit is "frivolous" if it is unworthy of the court's attention and wastes the court's valuable
resources. The legal definition of the term "frivolous" has been stated as "[g]iven to triflings, not
worth notice," 37 C.J.S. 1392, and "[o]f little weight or importance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 601
(5th ed. 1979). Examples of obviously frivolous suits include a fan's suit against the Chicago Bears
for misrepresenting itself as a professional football team and an inmate's suit for nuisance on the
grounds that a newly installed toilet seat was too cold. W. FREEDMAN, FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND
FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES § 1.1, at 4 (1987) (listing other humorous examples of frivolous cases). Aside
from such obvious cases, however, dictionary definitions give little guidance on whether a particu-
lar claim or filing is frivolous. The types of claims that this Note addresses-those based on untrue
facts-are frivolous by definition. Whether such filings are sanctionable and who the court should
sanction depends on the allocation of duty that this Note discusses.
39. See, e.g., S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 1 (1985) (stating that
"courts are too often confronted with an unknown but unacceptably large number of frivolous
actions"). "Because frivolousness is a matter of judgment, it is not reflected in court statistics...
[however,] few would dispute. . . that there is a good deal of frivolous litigation.. . ." Id. at 2 n.4.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments (stating that "in
practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses").
41. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 1.1, at 2. The Anglo-American
judicial system differs in this respect from systems in civil law countries where the inquisitorial
system prevails. Id.
42. Id.
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must conduct themselves and their cases according to the highest stan-
dards of professional conduct.43 This responsibility includes the duty to
refrain from using the courts for frivolous purposes."
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an addi-
tional incentive to avoid frivolous lawsuits by requiring courts to im-
pose sanctions on those who file "pleadings,' motions, and other papers"
that are not "well grounded" in fact or law.45 Joseph Story introduced
the concept of well-grounded pleadings in the United States in an 1838
treatise in which he described the rule requiring the signature of coun-
sel on pleadings as seeking to ensure that the suit rested on "good
ground. ' 48 The signature requirement, which had arisen in England in
the time of Sir Thomas More, originally gave counsel the quasi-judicial
function of examining the pleading to certify that its form was proper.
Thus, the good ground language arose originally from a function of at-
torneys that is loosely analogous to their modern role as officers of the
court.48
Story's purpose in initiating the good ground requirement in Fed-
eral Equity practice was apparently only to secure lawyer honesty.49
The 1912 version of Equity Rule 24, however, required a lawyer's signa-
ture as a certification of good ground for the plea, thereby restoring the
historical quasi-judicial function of the signature requirement.50 The
43. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). The Preamble provides: "Law-
yers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this
role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal sys-
tem. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct"
Id., Preamble (footnote omitted).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT, Preamble 4 (1983) (recognizing that "[a]
lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes"). But see Miller, supra note
19, at 18 (arguing that attorneys are driven by their duty to represent their clients and their own
economic self-interest and that "vague notions that attorneys owe a duty to the judicial system by
virtue of their status as court officers are feeble counterweights in making day-to-day decisions").
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This Note concentrates on the "fact" portion of this requirement.
46. J. STORY, EQurrY PLEADINGS ch. 11, § 47 (1838), discussed in Risinger, Honesty in Plead-
ing and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61
MINN. L. REv. 1, 9-14 (1976).
47. Risinger, supra note 46, at 10-11 & n.22.
48. See id. at 10 n.22 for a history of the split nature of the legal profession and the varying
levels of status, duty, and privilege afforded to counsel in the time of Sir Thomas More. More took
the signature function from the Masters of Chancery, a section of the profession with the status of
junior judges, and gave it to the ordinary Counsel. Id.
49. Id.
50. Equity R. 24, 226 U.S. 655 (1912) provided:
Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by one or more solicitors of record,
and such signatures shall be considered as a certificate by each solicitor that he has read the
pleading so signed by him; that upon the instructions laid before him regarding the case there
is good ground for the same; that no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; and that it
is not interposed for delay.
See also Risinger, supra note 46, at 13 & n.26 (stating that "[t]he Rule. . . explicitly restored the
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1912 Rule also added a new certification that the pleading was not in-
terposed for delay.5
The drafters of the 1938 version of Rule 11 associated the good
ground requirement of Equity Rule 24 with a sanction for filing sham
pleadings.52 While commentators have criticized the 1938 version of
Rule 11 as inartfully drafted5 and confused,5 it is important to note
that the Rule nonetheless contemplated the traditional quasi-judicial
role of attorneys and imposed consequent duties on attorneys.
As with the current Rule 11, the primary purpose of the 1938 Rule
was to deter frivolous actions.5 5 The Rule permitted judges to "strike as
sham or false" pleadings designed to defeat the purpose of the Rule.5 6
Rule 11 required the signature of an attorney on every pleading of a
party represented by an attorney, and instructed parties who were not
represented by an attorney to sign their own pleadings. 57 The Rule im-
posed a duty of good faith on attorneys: courts could sanction them
only for willful violations.58 The 1938 Rule imposed no duty on clients
since it did not provide for sanctions against clients who were repre-
sented by attorneys.5 9
The 1938 version of Rule 11 has been criticized universally as inef-
fective in deterring abuses.8 0 In its first half-century, courts rarely in-
voked Rule 11.61 Sanctions were underutilized because the situations in
which to impose them were not clear,6" the range of available sanctions
historical office of being a safeguard against impertinence and scandal").
51. See Risinger, supra note 46, at 13 n.26.
52. FED. R CIV. P. 11 (1938); see also J. MOORE & D. LUCAS, 2A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
11.01, at 615 (1938). The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to "lay upon counsel
a definite moral and professional obligation." Id.
53. Risinger, supra note 46, at 8 n.20.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments.
55. Carter, supra note 16, at 4.
56. FED. R CiV. P. 11 (1938).
57. Id. The certification sentence of the 1938 Rule read as follows: "The signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938); see also Risinger, supra note 46, at 59 (stating that "the stan-
dards of Rule 11 are subjective standards").
59. Nor was there any provision for sanctions against a pro se litigant in the final version of
the 1938 Rule. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, § 1331, at 10 & n.7 (discussing a
provision in the May 1936 Preliminary Draft of the Rule that subjected pro se litigants to the same
obligations and penalties prescribed for attorneys, but which was not included in the final version
of the Rule).
60. See, e.g., id. § 1331, at 10-11; Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191
(1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments.
61. Risinger, supra note 46, at 34-37 (noting that there are only 19 reported cases between
1938 and 1976 in which a party sought sanctions). See also S. KAssIN, supra note 39, at 2 & n.7
(citing only one more case where a Rule 11 sanction was imposed through 1979).
62. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, § 1331, at 11.
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was not flexible enough to provide proper deterrence, 6 and the stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of attorneys who signed plead-
ings were vague. 4 The threat of sanctions under the 1938 version of
Rule 11 was so remote that the Rule was largely ignored. 5
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1980 in re-
sponse to the widely shared perception that litigants often abused the
discovery and pretrial processes. 6 Similar concerns of abuse motivated
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, which were part of an integrated
package of changes designed to curb the increasing delay and cost asso-
ciated with litigation. 7 The overriding policies of the 1983 amendments
were to encourage earlier pretrial disposition through greater judicial
involvement in case management, and to require lawyers to acknowl-
edge their responsibilities to the court and the judicial system. 8
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 attempted to put "teeth" in the
old rule through several important changes.6 9 First, the current rule re-
quires that all litigation papers filed on behalf of a represented party be
signed by an attorney.70 The signature certifies that the signer has read
the document and has concluded after a reasonable inquiry into the
facts and the law that the document is well grounded.71 Second, the
current rule mandates sanctions when a violation of its provisions oc-
curs. 7 2 Finally, the current rule extends the duty to conserve court re-
sources to all signers of documents, thus permitting sanctions against
clients as well as attorneys.73
C. The Client's Objective Duty to Investigate Factual Claims
Although the scope of the Rule 11 duty has been disputed,74 attor-
neys and pro se litigants must make a reasonable investigation into the
63. Miller, supra note 19, at 25 (stating that existing sanctions were either wrist slaps or
draconian dismissals or defaults which penalized clients for the misbehavior of their attorneys).
64. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 16, at 5 (noting that "[a]lso unsettled under the old Rule 11
was . . .how sure the attorney had to be before he or she could sign the pleadings").
65. Vairo, supra note 60, at 191.
66. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980); see also Com-
ment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?,
15 TEx. TECH L. REv. 887, 888 (1984).
67. Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended simultane-
ously. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095 (1983); see A. MILLER,
THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (1984); see also
Vairo, supra note 60, at 190.
68. Vairo, supra note 60, at 190.
69. Carter, supra note 16, at 4.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see supra note 1.
71. Id.
72. Id. The old rule did not require sanctions in any case.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
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facts of their claims.7 5 The nature of a represented client's duty to in-
vestigate factual claims, however, was even less clear under the Rule.
Two views emerged: the subjective good faith duty embraced by the
Second Circuit, 8 and the objective duty of reasonable investigation im-
posed by the Ninth Circuit.
7 7
In Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group 78 the Second Circuit
remanded for reconsideration under a subjective good faith standard a
case in which the district court had awarded sanctions against a client
for a frivolous copyright infringement claim.79 Calloway, the author of a
script for an animated science fiction movie, claimed the defendant in-
fringed on his copyrighted material by demeaning and cheapening it in
a movie presentation book. 0 The court noted that Calloway had agreed
to the defendant's use of his work, and that he had no evidence to sup-
port his claim that his former attorney had forged his signature on the
contract with the defendant.81 The court found, however, that Calloway
did not know his claim was frivolous and that he did not act in bad
faith.82 Although it affirmed the sanctions against the attorney, the Cal-
loway court held that courts cannot sanction a party represented by an
attorney unless the party had "actual knowledge" that the filing made
false statements. 8
The Ninth Circuit in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commu-
nications Enterprises, Inc.8 took a different approach. Business
Guides, a leading publisher of business directories, protected itself
against copyright infringement by competitors by planting bits of incor-
rect information called "seeds" in its directories.8 5 When the same in-
correct information appeared in a competitor's directory, it was
HARv. L. REv. 630, 641 (stating that "almost half the judges in the survey would have sanctioned as
frivolous the same paper the other half. . . thought did not violate the [R]ule").
75. See, e.g., Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 120 F.R.D. 439 (D.D.C. 1988) (imposing sanc-
tions on both attorney and client for their failure to investigate factual allegations).
76. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part sub
nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
77. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.
1989), afl'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
78. 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel En-
tertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
79. Id. at 1456.
80. Id. at 1458.
81. Id. at 1455, 1464.
82. Id. at 1474.
83. Id. at 1474. Because courts should not sanction clients for legally frivolous claims, see
infra subpart VI (D), such a subjective standard means in effect that courts may only sanction
clients for bad faith claims.
84. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
85. 892 F.2d at 804.
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evidence that the competitor had copied Business Guides' directory.86
Due, however, to a logical flaw in the process by which Business Guides
created the seeds for a particular directory, the seeds that were the ba-
sis for Business Guides' action against the defendant contained accu-
rate, rather than inaccurate, information.8 7 Consequently, the district
court dismissed the copyright infringement action and imposed Rule 11
sanctions on Business Guides.8 On appeal, Business Guides claimed
that the district court erroneously applied an objective standard to a
represented party. 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, and,
stressing the language of the Rule,90 held that the Rule imposes the
same objective standard of reasonable factual inquiry on represented
parties as it does on attorneys.9 1
In a five to four decision,92 the United States Supreme Court up-
held the Ninth Circuit's objective standard and rejected the Second
Circuit's subjective test. Under the majority's plain meaning ap-
proach,93 Rule 11 applies a single standard of objective reasonableness
to attorneys and represented parties.9 ' The majority did concede, how-
ever, that what is reasonable for a client might be different from what is
reasonable for an attorney.
9 5
According to the dissent, the majority mistakenly read into the
Rule a duty of factual investigation for clients.96 The dissent admon-
ished the majority for ignoring the Rule's historical role of governing
the conduct of attorneys.9 7 The dissent also rejected the Ninth Circuit's
86. Id.
87. Id. Business Guides created the seeds for the directory at issue in this case by checking
the final directory against the responses to the initial questionnaires it had sent to the companies
listed. When it found differences, Business Guides assumed they were errors in the final directory.
Nine of the then resulting seeds, however, were caused by errors in the responses to the question-
naires that had been corrected prior to the final version of the directory. Id.
88. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 119 F.R.D. 685 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 402 (N.D.
Cal. 1988).
89. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 807.
90. The language the court emphasized was: "The signature of an attorney or party. .
and "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact." Id. at 809 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 812.
92. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications, Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Blackmun, and Souter joined. Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens,
and Scalia. (Justice Scalia joined the dissent in parts I, III, and IV only.)
93. Id. at 928 (citing Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456, 458
(1989)).
94. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 931.
95. Id. at 933.
96. Id. at 935, 937 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 936 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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contention that applying an objective standard to pro se litigants but
not to represented parties is inconsistent," arguing that applying differ-
ent standards to the two groups would preserve the Rule's purpose of
imposing a duty on those who practice before the court."" The dissent
maintained that it was reasonable to apply an objective standard to pro
se litigants who stand before the court in the capacity of an attorney
but not to represented parties.100
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD
As with any legal rule, the Court's objective standard for clients
inevitably will be interpreted differently in different cases.10' When de-
ciding how to apply the standard in a particular case, courts should
keep in mind the purpose of Rule 11. This section, using simple eco-
nomic analysis, first examines what the Rule theoretically should do in
a perfect society. 02 After studying the effects of the optimal Rule 11,
this section examines what Rule 11 can do within the constraints of the
real world if it is applied properly. 0 3
A. What Should Rule 11 Do?
1. Deterrence As Cost Avoidance
Rule 11 speaks the language of tort law;104 it creates a duty to take
reasonable care to avoid frivolous pleadings and imposes sanctions for
the breach of that duty. By imposing a duty to investigate the factual
basis of claims on both attorneys and their clients, the Rule shifts the
costs of such investigations to those who use the courts. 05 Economic
analysis is helpful in understanding how and why the Rule imposes
98. Id. at 937 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 811.
99. 111 S. Ct. at 937 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. The majority rejected this view, finding that the Advisory Committee could have
made such a distinction between represented and unrepresented parties, but did not do so. Id. at
931.
101. For a general discussion of problems of interpretation, see R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 262-85 (1990). The Business Guides Court conceded that what is reasonable will
vary from case to case. 111 S. Ct. at 933.
102. See infra subpart III(A)(1). While the Court's job may be to decide what the law is,
thankfully this Note is not so constrained. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 932 (cautioning that
the Court is "not acting on a clean slate" with respect to Rule 11 and must decide not what the
Rule should be, but what it is).
103. See infra subpart III(B).
104. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989).
105. Cf. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 126 (1987) (dis-
cussing the costs of due care in negligence). When a party filing a legal paper is required to make a
certain factual investigation before filing the paper, the cost of the factual investigation is
equivalent to a processing fee for the privilege of having the court consider that paper.
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these costs.110
Deterrence is the overarching goal of Rule 11. l 07 The Rule seeks to
deter frivolous lawsuits because they are wasteful-they- impose social
costs by occupying scarce judicial resources that could be used on meri-
torious causes of action.108 The Rule seeks to minimize the social costs
that frivolous claims generate.10 9 Thus, the goal of deterrence is really a
goal of cost avoidance.110
2. The Costs of Frivolous Claims
To determine how best to avoid the costs of frivolous claims, one
must first identify those costs. The most obvious cost is that of defend-
ing against a frivolous claim.'11 This cost consists of legal fees and other
expenses, including opportunity cost, incurred in defending against the
frivolous claim.1 1 2 In the absence of a fee-shifting provision such as
Rule 11,1 the defendant would bear this cost. Frivolous claims also
require the court's involvement.1 4 This court time cost includes the sal-
aries of the judge and the court staff as well as the cost of supplies and
106. Economic analysis is particularly useful in analyzing rules such as Rule 11 that impose
duties and consequent costs on parties, and it has been employed particularly in the area of tort
law. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccmENTs-A LEGAL AND ECONoMIc ANALYSIS (1970).
107. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (stating that "any inter-
pretation [of Rule 11] must give effect to the rule's central goal of deterrence"); see also Carter,
supra note 16, at 4; Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE LJ. 901, 903
(1988). But see Note, supra note 38, at 354-57 (stating that Rule 11 has multiple purposes).
108. See G. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 257 (1989).
109. This emphasis on the cost of frivolous claims may seem counter to the historical notion
of Rule 11 as a mechanism for achieving ethical goals. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
That courts sanction good faith as well as bad faith claims by attorneys and clients, however,
indicates that the ethical considerations behind the Rule are secondary to the goal of cost
minimization.
110. For a discussion of the cost avoidance goal in tort law, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 106,
at 26-31. Professor Calabresi outlines three subgoals of accident cost reduction: (1) to reduce the
number and severity of accidents; (2) to reduce the societal costs arising from accidents; and (3) to
reduce the cost of administering our treatment of accidents. Id. Replacing the term "accidents" in
this list with "frivolous claims" gives an accurate description of Rule 11's goals.
111. For example, Chromatic Communications' legal expenses alone in defending against
Business Guides' frivolous claim were $13,865.66. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communica-
tions Enter., Inc., 892 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1989).
112. For example, if D's wage is $10 per hour and he spends $50 in legal fees and 5 hours of
his time defending against P's frivolous claim, his cost is $100. See Harb v. Gallagher, 131 F.R.D.
381, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (showing the calculation of attorney's fees and costs). To determine the
proper amount of sanctions, courts frequently have used the lodestar approach, which is based on
the average billing rate of attorneys in the region and the average amount of time the defense
should have taken. See, e.g., id. at 385.
113. The Supreme Court held recently, however, that the courts have inherent power to shift
the burden of attorney's fees apart from the sanctions provisions contained in Rule 11, FED. R. APP.
P. 38, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2135 (1991).
114. The time the court takes to determine that the claim is frivolous is costly. See W.
LANDES & R POSNER, supra note 105, at 126 (noting that "[ilnformation costs are real costs").
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electricity.1 ' If Rule 11 did not require litigants who bring frivolous
claims to reimburse these costs through Rule 11 sanctions," 6 society at
large would bear these costs. Finally, a less direct and less obvious, but
much discussed, cost is the delay frivolous claims cause in already over-
crowded courts. 1 7 This consists of the cost to other litigants of waiting
to have their disputes resolved in court, the cost of the decline in the
quality of justice due to overworked judges,"" and the general cost of
society's disillusionment with the judicial system." 9 While they are dif-
ficult to measure, it is clear that to individuals who use the court sys-
tem and to society as a whole these costs could be enormous.1
2 0
3. The Costs of Deterrence
Rule 11 seeks to avoid the costs imposed by factually frivolous
claims by creating a duty to investigate before a litigant brings a claim.
But the Rule itself imposes costs. 121 Most obviously, the party filing a
pleading faces the cost of conducting an investigation to determine
whether the filing is well grounded in fact. This cost may be negligible
115. The average cost to the government of a civil case in 1982 was $1500. J. KAKALIK & R.
Ross, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM xix (1983).
116. In general, Rule 11 has not been used to impose all these costs on sanctioned parties.
See, e.g., Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 807 (noting that "the [district court] considered but re-
jected the possibility of ordering Business Guides to reimburse the public fisc for the cost of the
court's time"). Including social costs in sanctions is seen as unduly punitive by most courts. See S.
KASSIN, supra note 39, at 39-40 (noting that only 6 of 292 judges surveyed suggested court costs as
a supplement to attorney's fee sanctions).
117. See, e.g., G. JOSEPH, supra note 108, at 257; Miller, supra note 19, at 1-2.
118. Professor Miller suggests that delay creates a "churning effect," meaning that the longer
a case waits to be processed and heard, the more work it will eventually generate for the system.
Miller, supra note 19, at 14. Miller is also troubled by the ability of an overcrowded judicial system
to attract the most talented judges:
The quality of our justice system depends on the character of the personnel we are able to
attract as judges and how long they endure. In the long run the frustration created by the
present state of affairs will deprive the system of considerable talent, both by motivating
judges to resign early and by deterring potential candidates from serving at all. Judgeships
compete with the high salaries of private practice and the prestige and autonomy of academia.
The chief attractions of the bench are nonmonetary. If we want to prevent the quality of our
judiciary from declining to an unacceptably low level, we must pay attention to the in-
tangibles of the job-both its rewards and its frustrations.
Id. at 35.
119. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. One federal district judge has described to-
day's litigation process as "a constant flow of poorly prepared, ill-considered, and often misleading,
if not downright deceptive, papers filed by attorneys." Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Fed-
eral Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1985).
120. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 2 (stating that "the escalating cost of litigation, cou-
pled with intolerable delay, leads to an overall financial and emotional price tag for justice that
often is beyond the means of all but the wealthy and sturdy").
121. See generally S. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION-THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, 77-83 (1989) (discussing costs of Rule 11).
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in the case of easily ascertainable facts122 or could be quite large when
the requisite investigation is more difficult.'2  The attorney and client
filing the claim bear this cost, which is essentially analogous to a
processing fee to get into court."
This prefiling investigation cost creates another less observable
cost. When either the cost of investigation or the cost of the sanctions
for failure to investigate becomes too high, these costs may deter pro-
spective litigants from bringing valid claims.1 25 This "chilling effect"1 26
could make the courts inaccessible to certain groups in society.12 7 A
Rule that imposes too great a prefiling cost on litigants may price the
poor out of the legal system.1 28 Society in general would bear the result-
ing CoStS.
129
4. The Ultimate Goal-An Optimal Level of Deterrence
Although at first glance the primary goal of Rule 11 appears to be
deterrence of the costs imposed by frivolous claims, a Rule that man-
dates high investigation duties imposes rather severe costs of its own.
The ultimate goal of the Rule should be to minimize the sum of the cost
of frivolous claims and the cost necessary to avoid frivolous claims.1 30 If
122. For instance, in Business Guides the district court judge's clerk spent approximately
one hour making a few phone calls to determine that Business Guides' complaint was factually
inaccurate. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 892 F.2d 802, 805
(9th Cir. 1989), afl'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
123. See, e.g., Sauls v. Penn Virginia Resources Corp., 121 F.R.D. 657, 663 (W.D. Va. 1988)
(holding that attorneys acted reasonably in filing papers when the only way to find facts was to
continue to investigate through discovery).
124. This discussion treats the attorney and client as a unit for simplicity's sake. This Note
later discusses how this cost is allocated within the attorney-client relationship. See infra Parts
IV-VII.
125. Among prospective litigants, there may be a group who will file claims if their only cost
is their attorney's fee and the opportunity cost of their time, but who will not file those claims if
they must also incur investigation costs or risk sanctions. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 941
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
126. See S. BURBANK, supra note 121, at 84-85. The Rule may also poison relations between
attorneys and their clients, and sanctions may damage an attorney's reputation. Id. at 85-88.
127. See G. JOSEPH, supra note 108, at 253 (arguing that judges should be wary of allowing
Rule 11 sanctions to discourage certain types of litigation).
128. The poor may need the legal system more than any other socioeconomic group to vindi-
cate rights. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(discussing the need to give easy access to courts for cases against government officials, First
Amendment cases, civil rights cases, and habeas corpus cases), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
129. An additional cost not included in this discussion is the cost of enforcement that is
imposed on the judicial system. See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Federal Rules After Half a Century, 36
ME. L. REv. 243, 244 (1984) (stating that "[r]ules require sanctions" and "[s]anctions require en-
forcement proceedings," and that "[tihese absorb resources of time, energy, and money that it is
the very purpose of the rules to spare").
130. Cf. G. CALABREsi, supra note 106, at 26 (stating that "it [is] axiomatic that the principal
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complete deterrence of frivolous claims imposes higher aggregate costs
than those associated with frivolous claims under a less strict rule, then
a less strict rule is preferable in achieving the goal of cost avoidance.131
The optimal level of deterrence is that level at which the total costs of
the frivolous claims that get into court under the Rule, combined with
the investigation costs imposed and the cost of the Rule's chilling effect,
are minimized.13 2 The ultimate goal of Rule 11 should be to reach this
optimal level of deterrence.
5. The Optimal Rule in Idylica-An Example
An example will illustrate how the optimal Rule 11 would work.
The land of Idylica has no rule to deter factually frivolous claims, and
each year five litigants bring such claims. In an attempt to minimize the
costs of these claims, the Supreme Court of Idylica is considering five
options that range from a rule imposing a prefiling investigation duty
with a cost of five, which would deter all factually frivolous claims, to a
rule imposing a prefiling investigation duty with a cost of one, deterring
only one of the five annual frivolous claims. 3 The court commissions a
study to determine the costs that current frivolous claims impose on its
society and the costs the alternative rules would impose. The study
finds the following information:
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding
accidents").
131. "The challenge . . . is to eliminate the 'frivolous' cases, without unfairly discouraging
claims of potential substance and without expending considerable judicial resources in the pro-
cess." Oberman, Coping With Rising Caseload II: Defining the Frivolous Civil Appeal, 47 BROOK
L. Rzv. 1057, 1058 (1981). Cf. G. CALABRESi, supra note 106, at 17 (stating that society is not
committed to avoiding accidents at all costs).
132. This is the Pareto optimal level of sanctions. Pareto optimality is reached when "there
is no change from that situation that can make someone better off without making someone else
worse off." A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONoMIcs 7 n.4 (2d ed. 1989). At the
Pareto optimal level of Rule 11 deterrence, any higher level of deterrence would result in chilling
effect costs, which would make the total costs higher than they are at the optimal level, and any
lower level of deterrence would result in delay costs, which would make the total costs higher than
they are at the optimal level. See also Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 44
(1960) ("In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total
effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.").




RESULTS OF IDYLICA RULES COMMITTEE STUDY
COSTS OF FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS COSTS OF RULE
Frivolous
claims Defense Court Delay Investi- Chilling
getting costs costs costs gation effect TOTAL
to court (5/claim) (2/claim) (13/claim) costs* costs COST
0 0 0 0 (5) 25 75 100
1 5 2 13 (4) 20 50 90
2 10 4 26 (3) 15 25 80
3 15 6 39 (2) 10 15 85
4 20 8 52 (1) 5 8 93
5 25 10 65 (0) 0 0 100
* The number in parenthesis is the prefiling investigation cost per
claim imposed by the given proposed rule.
As the study shows, in Idylica the cost imposed by frivolous claims
is constant at twenty per claim-five of defense costs plus two of court
costs plus thirteen of delay costs-ranging from zero cost with no
claims getting into court to a cost of one hundred when all five annual
claims get to court."" The costs imposed by the different proposed rules
vary with the number of frivolous claims they deter.'3 5 Because each
proposed rule, however, imposes a different duty to investigate and thus
a different cost of investigation, the per-claim cost of the various rules
ment imposes costs under Rule 11. If the reasonable investigation duty means that any factually
frivolous claim is sanctionable, then the duty to investigate and its consequent costs are very
high-comparable to the investigation cost of 5 in Table 1. If, however, the term "reasonable" is
interpreted less strictly to mean cursory, then the duty to investigate and its consequent costs are
much lower-more like the investigation cost of 1 in Table 1. Obviously, the assumption made in
this discussion, that a given rule imposes a blanket standard of reasonableness in all cases-a given
prefiling investigation cost that is always reasonable-is unrealistic. Later sections of this Note
explain why this assumption is unrealistic and argue that any interpretation of Rule 11 should be
flexible enough to allow variation in the standard of reasonableness. See infra Parts IV-VII.
134. Again, this may be an unrealistic assumption. As the number of frivolous claims in-
creases, the marginal cost of each one may increase because the delay costs imposed may increase
geometrically. See supra note 118. Since multiple frivolous claims may be brought in the same
action, however, the marginal defense cost and marginal court cost for each claim within the same
lawsuit may actually decrease with more frivolous claims. If a defendant has already retained
counsel and the judge has already familiarized herself with the case, a second frivolous claim may
be disposed of more easily than the first one. Because data on these possible marginal cost trends
is unavailable, the marginal cost of each frivolous claim is assumed to be constant in Idylica. This
assumption has the added benefit of simplicity.
135. For example, the proposal that allows one frivolous claim, and thus deters four, has a
cost of 70-20 of investigation costs (4 per claim) plus 50 of chilling effect costs.
[Vol. 44:11651182
1991] CLIENT'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 1183
is not constant. 13 6 In Idylica a complete deterrent rule, with a prefiling
investigation cost of five, has a significant chilling effect on those who
would bring valid claims if the prefiling cost were not so high.'3 7 The
cost of this chilling effect to Idylica is seventy-five. With a prefiling in-
vestigation cost of four, however, more prospective litigants with valid
claims bring their claims, and the chilling effect cost is reduced to fifty.
The chilling effect cost is zero under the current regime, which has no
prefiling duty to investigate. s13
The total cost to Idylica of the various rule proposals is the sum of
the costs of the frivolous claims allowed under a given rule plus the
costs imposed by that rule. As Table 1 illustrates, in this hypothetical
society the optimal rule deters three frivolous claims a year and allows
two to get into court. Under this proposed rule the total cost to Idylica
reaches its minimum at eighty per year. This rule best accomplishes the
Supreme Court of Idylica's goal of cost avoidance. In Idylica allowing
two factually frivolous claims a year to get to court is optimal.3,
B. What Can Rule 11 Do?
1. Cost Minimization
In a fantasy world with perfect information, such as Idylica, it is
possible to measure the optimal level of deterrence. In our society, how-
ever, one can only estimate the cost imposed by frivolous lawsuits and
the alternative cost imposed by a rule that chills legitimate claims by
136. As the per-claim investigation cost imposed by the rule changes, the total investigation
cost of the 5 claims changes. In addition, as the duty imposed by the rule varies, the chilling effect
of the rule varies, so the costs associated with the chilling effect vary.
137. To illustrate the chilling effect cost shown in Table 1, assume there are 100 people in
Idylica who would bring claims if there were no prefiling investigation cost-demand for the courts
would be 100. When the investigation cost is 5, 75 people would be deterred from bringing their
actions-demand for the courts is only 25. If the investigation cost were lowered to 3, 50 of those
who would not bring claims at a price of 5 would bring claims, leaving only 25 people deterred
from bringing claims and raising demand for the courts to 75. Table 1 shows chilling effect costs in
currency units rather than in terms of numbers of people deterred, but the effect is the same.
138. Because of the delay in bringing claims due to circumstances other than frivolous
claims, see supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text, there may be a substantial chilling effect in
our system aside from that created by frivolous claims. This chilling effect, however, is beyond the
scope of Rule 11 and is thus beyond the scope of this Note. The chilling effect costs in Table 1 are
those caused solely by costs of the duty to investigate.
139. Again, the goal in Idylica is to reduce the costs of frivolous claims and to discourage
litigants from bringing them, not necessarily to reduce the number of frivolous claims. See supra
note 131. Obviously, this example is oversimplified. First, it assumes that all the costs of frivolous
claims and the proposed rules are quantifiable. In the real world this is simply not the case. Sec-
ond, the example postulates a society in which the chilling effect is rather responsive to changes in
the duty imposed by the rules. This may or may not be true in the real world. Despite the admit-
tedly unrealistic assumptions, however, the example does illustrate that the optimal rule may not
be the one that completely deters all factually frivolous claims.
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overdeterring. 140 Thus, the goal in the real world should be to achieve
the optimal level of deterrence given the imperfect information
available.
The optimal level of deterrence is the level at which the total costs
imposed are minimized. 41 To develop the best rule, a judicial system
operating on a clean slate would need to know the delay costs imposed
by allowing all factually frivolous claims, the chilling effect costs of de-
terring all frivolous claims, and the costs of various options between
these two extremes.142 Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately,1 43 we are
not operating on a clean slate.14 4 Therefore, the discussion must center
on how to approach the ultimate goal of cost minimization within the
existing Rule. In striving for this goal, however, the optimal rule is not
necessarily the one that deters the most frivolous claims.
45
2. The Cheapest Cost Avoider Goal
In its present form Rule 11 imposes a duty on both the attorney
and the client to investigate the facts of a claim before pleading. The
Rule seeks to ensure that the lawyer and the client make this prefiling
investigation, and incur its costs, by imposing a sanction should they
fail to investigate reasonably.1 4 The Rule assumes implicitly that in
most cases the cost of the investigation will be less than the costs to the
opponent and society were there no duty to investigate. 147 Thus, Rule
11 has already taken an important first step that was not taken in
Idylica-it has imposed the duty on the party that can minimize the
140. Obviously, achieving the goal of optimal deterrence in the real world would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, because there is no way to measure accurately most of the costs in-
volved in the equation.
141. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
142. Idylica knew this information in determining its optimal level of deterrence. See supra
subpart III(A)(5).
143. "Fortunately" because the task of designing the perfect rule to deter frivolous claims
from scratch would be extremely complicated. Because Rule 11 has been in use since 1938 and has
been modified and interpreted by the courts since then, see supra notes 52-65 and accompanying
text, this task is not necessary, and the more limited task of making the Rule work as well as
possible in its present form is all we face.
144. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 932
(1991).
145. See supra subpart III(A)(5).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments (stating that "[ijf
the duty imposed by the [R]ule is violated, the court should have the discretion to impose sanc-
tions"). To be effective sanctions at least must be higher than the cost of investigation. Cf. W.
LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 105, at 60 (discussing individual decisions regarding the proper
amount of due care). While sanctions awarded by courts frequently do not include all of the social
costs imposed by frivolous claims, see supra note 123, they do create the threat of imposing costs
higher than the investigation cost.
147. This follows from the Rule's cost minimization goal. See supra subpart III(B)(1).
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total costs to society most easily.1 8  Since the overall goal is cost avoid-
ance and the party filing the suit is presumed to be able to avoid costs
most cheaply, the Rule imposes the duty on the filing party.
The cheapest cost avoider mode of economic analysis allows courts
to employ a legal cost-benefit analysis without having to evaluate the
costs and benefits on a case-by-case basis. 149 In an ideal society a case-
by-case evaluation would be desirable because the costs and benefits of
a rule imposing a duty to investigate will vary from case to case. 50 In-
stead of requiring courts to make such an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis,
however, the cheapest cost avoider rule requires only that they decide
who is in the best position to weigh the costs of factually frivolous
claims against the investigation costs necessary to avoid them.15' In the
case of Rule 11, the Supreme Court, under the Rules Enabling Act,'152
has decided that the attorney and the client who file the claim are in
the best position to make such a cost-benefit analysis. In order to make
the cost-benefit analysis reflect more than simply the individual costs
and benefits to the attorney and the client,15 3 the Rule provides for
sanctions should they decide not to perform a reasonable prefiling in-
vestigation and if they file a factually frivolous claim.15 4 Under Rule 11
the filing party is the cheapest cost avoider.
The Rule, however, is not explicit about how the duty of factual
investigation should be allocated between the attorney and the client. 55
148. If the cost of investigation (including chilling effect costs) is less than the costs that
would accrue without an investigation (defense costs, court costs, and delay costs), the filing party
can minimize costs by making an investigation.
149. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060 (1972).
150. See infra Part IV.
151. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 149, at 1060 & n.19.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to pro-
mulgate rules of procedure. Actually, the Rules are drafted by committees of the Judicial Confer-
ence and approved by the Court.
153. In the absence of a rule shifting at least some of the costs imposed by frivolous claims to
the party bringing those claims, the attorney and client would have little incentive to avoid frivo-
lous claims because their opponents in the litigation, the court system, and ultimately society
would bear the costs of those claims. Rule 11 seeks to internalize these costs. See supra subpart III
(A)(2).
154. It is entirely possible that a party undertaking less than the reasonable prefiling investi-
gation will bring a claim which is valid. For this reason the costs discussed here are not really the
actual cost of a sanction, but the cost of the sanction multiplied by the risk of incurring it with a
given level of investigation-the probability of harm. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand's famous definition of negligence: when the burden of pre-
cautions is less than the probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of the injury).
155. The Rule says that the "attorney or party" who signs the pleading, motion, or other
paper certifies that to the best of the signer's belief formed after reasonable inquiry the paper is
well grounded in fact. FED. R. CIv. P. 11. The case law has imposed the duty on both the attorney
and the client in many cases. See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Group Systems Int'l Far East,
Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594 (C.D. Cal. 1986); City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524
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The same cheapest cost avoider analysis is helpful in determining the
proper allocation of this duty between the attorney and the client.
Since the Court and its rulemaking committees have decided that the
attorney-client unit can avoid cost more cheaply than can the court sys-
tem, the opponent, or society, it is helpful to examine how cost minimi-
zation best can be achieved within the attorney-client relationship. 156
Courts should allocate the factual investigation duty imposed by Rule
11 based on a determination of the cheapest cost avoider within that
relationship.
IV. A MODEL FOR ANALYZING CLIENT SANCTIONS
In Business Guides the Supreme Court decided that clients who
are represented by counsel will be held to an objective standard in de-
termining whether they have conducted a reasonable factual investiga-
tion.15 7 This holding means that clients who sign papers may be subject
to sanctions even if they signed in good faith; as long as the pleading is
factually frivolous, the court may sanction the client.
158
The effectiveness of the objective standard of reasonable factual in-
quiry in reaching Rule 11's goal of cost minimization depends on how
flexibly courts apply it. Because litigants bring a wide range of factual
claims, each case requires a varying level of factual investigation.
159
Since there is also a wide variety of attorney-client relationships, the
party best able to minimize the costs of a factual investigation also var-
ies from case to case. It thus is desirable to apply Rule 11 flexibly so as
to place the duty of factual investigation on the cheapest cost avoider in
as many cases as possible. 60 The following example points out the
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
156. In other words, since either the attorney, the client, or both has the duty to undertake a
factual investigation, the Rule can best approach its overall goal of cost minimization by imposing
the duty on whoever can undertake an investigation most cheaply.
157. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 934-35
(1991).
158. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 934-35. The objective standard also may apply to clients
who do not sign filings. See id. at 941 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the greater chilling
impact if the negligence standard is applied to clients who do not'sign a Rule 11 paper); FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments (stating that "[e]ven though it is
the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may be appropriate under the circumstances of
the case to impose a sanction on the client"). The majority in Business Guides, however, did not
address this issue. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 935 (noting that "[w]e have no occasion to deter-
mine whether or under what circumstances a nonsigning party may be sanctioned").
159. The necessary factual investigation may range from a mere phone call, see, e.g., Portnoy
v. Wherehouse Entertainment Co., 120 F.R.D. 73, 74 (N.D. Ill. 1988), to "check[ing] closely the
plausibility" of a certain account of the facts. Mike Ousley Productions, Inc. v. Cabot, 130 F.R.D.
155 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
160. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 149, at 1060 n.19 (stating that "[w]e do not mean
to suggest that the party in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis is always in the best
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problems created by too rigid an application of the objective standard
and illustrates the need for flexibility.
After an extremely successful and very rainy football season, the
paint on the bleachers at State U. is peeling. The Board of Trustees,
under pressure from several prominent alumni, solicits bids to have the
bleachers painted. The trustees distribute a request for bids which
specifies the deadline for completion of the job and states that "the
paint shall be gray and of the highest quality." The request for bids
also states that "the sole criteria for the contract award are ability to
complete the job and price-the lowest bidder who can complete the
job as specified will be awarded the contract."
The trustees receive four bids. The first bidder is Poor Student
Painters (PSP), a group of four State U. students who have no painting
experience and are painting during the summer to earn money for
school. The second bid is received from the local office of Acme Paint-
ing Corporation (Acme), the region's largest painting operation, with
approximately five thousand employees and annual revenues of thirty
million dollars. The third bidder is Local Family Painters (LFP), a
fifty-year-old local painting business with five full-time employees and
annual revenues of two hundred thousand dollars. The final bid is re-
ceived from Slippery Watercolors, an out-of-state painting contractor
with no local office. The trustees determine that all four bidders can do
the job and in an open bidding process award the contract to Slippery
Watercolors, the lowest bidder.
Approximately one week after work begins on the job, PSP, Acme,
and LFP each receive an anonymous tip from a person claiming to be a
former Slippery Watercolors employee. The tipster claims that Slippery
Watercolors habitually dilutes its paints and that this is probably how
it was able to underbid the other painters on the State U. job. The
painting columnist for the local newspaper, who also received a call
from the tipster, writes in his column, "I went down and looked at the
State U. bleachers, and based on my three years of experience as a pro-
fessional painter, I'd say this state is getting ripped off-that paint is
diluted."
In response to this tip, PSP, Acme, and LFP retain local attorneys
and file separate complaints in federal district court against Slippery
Watercolors, seeking an injunction against further work on the State U.
job and a reconsideration of the contract award. The three complaints
allege that Slippery Watercolors has diluted the paint and thus has vio-
position to act upon it"). This Note suggests that when the Rule imposes the duty of investigation
on a client who is not the cheapest cost avoider, that client should be allowed to bargain to shift
the duty to the attorney through attorney indemnification. See infra Part V.
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lated the "highest quality" clause of the bid request. The basis for the
complaints is the anonymous tip and the newspaper article. The com-
plaints are signed by the attorneys and a representative of each paint-
ing company.
The three cases go to trial, and the court determines that the paint
used by Slippery Watercolors in fact was not diluted. The court finds
that it is well known in the painting business that a painter with seven
or more years of experience can tell if paint has been diluted by visual
inspection. Since seven years is the average level of experience among
professional painters, the court determines that an average painting
company should have known the paint was not diluted. Despite the fact
that the claims were made in good faith in all three cases, the court
imposes five thousand dollar sanctions jointly and severally on each of
the attorneys and clients, citing the Business Guides objective standard
for imposing sanctions on clients.
A. Costs of Investigation
In other painting cases the local lawyers have retained a local
painting expert who has thirty years of experience as an expert witness.
It would have taken the expert approximately one hour to drive to the
stadium, look at the bleachers, and determine that Slippery Watercol-
ors' paint was not diluted. His time would have cost each of the lawyers
$200. Each of the clients in the three suits, however, would have had
different costs of investigation.
1. Poor Student Painters (PSP)
Since none of the students has any painting experience, they could
not tell by looking at the bleachers that the paint was not diluted. Con-
sequently, in order to realize that their claim was factually inaccurate
the students would have had to hire an expert, such as their lawyer's
expert, at a cost of $200. Since the students did not know any painting
experts, however, they would have had to leave the job they were work-
ing on to locate and retain an expert. The students would have earned
$100 during this time had they not been away from work. The total cost
of an objectively reasonable investigation for them thus would have
been $300-the cost of the expert plus the opportunity cost of their
time.
In the case of PSP, the court's objective standard imposes a duty
to investigate on the students at a cost of $300. But since PSP's lawyer
could have determined the paint was not diluted at a cost of $200, the
objective standard imposes $100 more investigation cost than would a
less rigid standard that only held clients to a good faith duty. Since
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Rule 11 requires an attorney's signature on every paper and imposes an
objective standard of reasonable inquiry on attorneys, a good faith stan-
dard for clients would result in $200 of investigation cost and, in this
case, would achieve the goal of cost minimization. Here, the attorney is
the cheapest cost avoider.
2. Acme Painting Corporation (Acme)
Since Acme is a large painting company, it has a number of paint-
ers with more than seven years of experience who could examine the
bleachers and tell that the paint was not diluted. Acme could ask one of
its painters to stop by the football field to make the necessary visual
inspection. This inspection would cost Acme $100 due to the time the
painter would be away from work. The total cost of an objectively rea-
sonable factual inquiry for Acme is thus $100.
In Acme's case the court's objective standard of reasonable inquiry
imposes a $100 duty. Because Acme's local lawyer would have to spend
$200 to hire the painting expert to make the same inspection, the objec-
tive standard in this case achieves the goal of cost minimization by im-
posing the duty to investigate on Acme. Under a good faith standard
for clients, the attorney would make the investigation at a cost of $200,
which would be $100 more costly than necessary. Here, the client rather
than the attorney is the cheapest cost avoider.
3. Local Family Painters (LFP)
LFP has five full-time employees, but only one has more than
seven years of painting experience. LFP's senior employee manages the
paint store, and in order to perform a visual inspection of the bleachers
during daylight he would have to close the shop for an hour. This would
result in lost revenues for the business of about $200, although this is
difficult to estimate since certain days are busier than others. The cost
of an objectively reasonable factual investigation for LFP is thus about
$200.
In LFP's case the court's objective standard imposes a duty to in-
vestigate with a cost of approximately $200, depending on how busy the
shop is on the day of the investigation. Since LFP's lawyer also would
have to spend $200 for the paint expert, it may not matter whether the
Rule imposes the duty to investigate on LFP or its attorney. A good
faith standard or an objective standard would result in the same $200
investigation cost. Either standard minimizes costs because LFP and its
attorney are equally cheap cost avoiders.
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B. Deterrence Revisited
While often stated in terms of deterrence, the primary goal of Rule
11 is cost minimization. 161 Because Rule 11 imposes an objectively rea-
sonable duty to investigate on the filing attorneys, in most cases attor-
neys will undertake the necessary investigation whether or not courts
impose a similar objective duty on clients. 62 For the court system as a
whole, holding clients to a higher objective standard of care will mini-
mize costs if it deters enough additional frivolous claims to outweigh
the chilling effect costs it causes. If the investigation cost is high and
the objective standard does not deter frivolous claims, the chilling effect
costs probably outweigh the deterrence benefits of the standard.
6 3
The objective standard's deterrence depends on the nature of the
specific client, and the cost minimization effect of the Rule depends on
the litigiousness of similarly situated prospective claimants.6 " For ex-
ample, in the case of PSP the objective duty standard imposes a $300
investigation cost but probably has little deterrent effect. There is little
deterrence because PSP is unlikely to litigate again; if PSP never files
another claim, the sanctioned students will have been punished, but the
objective standard of duty will not have deterred them from filing other
frivolous claims. Similarly, the cost minimization effect of the objective
standard is negligible. Since student painting businesses like PSP rarely
go to court, this class of litigants would not bring many frivolous
claims.16 5 For small student businesses like PSP, however, the $300 cost
161. See supra subpart III(B)(1).
162. When the necessary investigation is simple enough to be undertaken by either the attor-
ney or the client, the objective standard of reasonableness will place the principal duty to investi-
gate on either or both. What is reasonable may be different for a client than for an attorney,
however, Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933, and whether the attorney or client bears the principal
duty to conduct more difficult factual investigations could mean the difference between avoiding or
not avoiding a frivolous claim.
163. A high-cost, nondeterrent rule fails to avoid the costs of frivolous claims and simultane-
ously increases the chilling effects. This situation may occur if courts impose the duty of investiga-
tion on a class of litigants whose behavior is not responsive to a change in duty.
164. This distinction has been described elsewhere as that between specific deterrence and
general deterrence. Untereiner, supra note 107, at 908-09. Rule 11 achieves specific deterrence
when a particular sanction prevents the particular party on whom that sanction is imposed from
bringing another frivolous claim. See, e.g., Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183-84 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that the primary purpose of Rule 11 is to deter subsequent abuses in the same
litigation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987). The Rule achieves general deterrence when it discour-
ages other litigants from bringing frivolous claims by encouraging an adequate level of factual
inquiry. See, e.g., Untereiner, supra note 107, at 908. The cost minimization goal of the Rule is in
part a general deterrence goal, and, as this Note shows, cost minimization is not necessarily depen-
dent on specific deterrence. See supra subpart III(A)(5). For this reason, the terms "general" and
"specific" may confuse more than they clarify.
165. To achieve the goal of cost minimization by deterring the most frivolous claims, sanc-
tions should be directed at those classes of litigants that use the courts most frequently. The most
frequent litigators tend to be those with the greatest financial resources because they have the
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of getting through the courthouse door will have a significant chilling
effect and will discourage many prospective claims. Because the chilling
costs of the objective standard outweigh its deterrence benefits in this
situation, the objective standard is not the cost-minimizing rule.
In the case of Acme, however, the objective standard probably does
have a significant deterrent effect. Acme, a large corporation, frequently
disputes contracts in court. The sanction in the Slippery Watercolors
case will probably deter Acme from filing frivolous actions in the future.
Since the investigation cost for large companies like Acme is low, the
chilling effect of the $100 cost to get through the courthouse door will
be minimal. Since the deterrent effect of the objective standard proba-
bly outweighs the chilling effect, the objective standard is the cost-mini-
mizing rule in Acme's case.
In the case of LFP the $200 investigation duty on the family paint-
ing business may have some deterrent effect, depending on how often
LFP brings contract claims to court. Since such businesses presumably
do have to go to court occasionally, the sanction imposed on LFP in the
Slippery Watercolors case probably will prevent some frivolous claims.
The $200 investigation cost, however, may chill some legitimate claims
for litigants like LFP. Since it is impossible to tell whether this chilling
effect cost outweighs the deterrent benefits of the objective standard on
an aggregate basis, the objective standard may or may not be the cost-
minimizing rule.
C. Distributional Effects
In many cases the cost of investigating the facts may be lower for a
large corporation than for a small business or individual."' 6 In the case
of the factual investigation of the State U. bleacher paint, it cost the
students $300 to investigate while it cost Acme only $100. As this exam-
ple shows, applying the objective duty standard may have distributional
effects because if a court uses the good faith standard the lawyers for
both PSP and Acme would incur a $200 investigation cost.167 Further-
most to protect, can best afford the costs of delay, and can best spread the costs of delay. See
Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW &
Soc'y RE V. 525, 551 (1981) (reviewing data showing that the probability of a party making a claim
increases with income and educational level). The corollary of this is that those with the greatest
financial resources also tend to be the cheapest cost avoiders. See supra subpart IV(A).
166. A large corporation probably has more alternative ways to conduct the necessary inves-
tigation. In the example, Acme could send an employee whose opportunity cost was $100 per hour,
while the only possible investigator for LFP had an opportunity cost of $200 per hour. See supra
subpart IV(A).
167. A subjective standard would impose the same cost on all litigants-the $200 they would
pay their attorneys to investigate their claims. The objective standard, however, could impose dif-
ferent costs on different litigants for investigating the same claim.
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more, since small businesses like PSP are more likely to be chilled by
every dollar of investigation cost than large corporations like Acme, 168 it
is troublesome that PSP faces a $300 cost in contrast to Acme's $100
cost. The objective standard places a disproportionate burden on small
companies and individuals by imposing a higher cost on them even
though they are more susceptible to chilling effects. Since small compa-
nies and individuals often need legal recourse to protect their rights,
the distributional effects of the objective standard may run counter to
the fundamental maxim of equal justice.1 19
V. BARGAINING TO EFFICIENCY?
The foregoing analysis of the cost minimization effects of the objec-
tive duty of factual investigation reveals that when the client's cost of
investigation is higher than the attorney's, the attorney is the cheapest
cost avoider and the objective standard is not as cost efficient as the
good faith or subjective standard. Additionally, the objective standard
may have the undesirable effect of imposing a higher investigation cost
on less sophisticated clients and a lower investigation cost on more so-
phisticated clients than the subjective standard imposes. The objective
standard often does not impose the costs on the cheapest cost avoider
but instead distributes costs disproportionately to those clients least
able to absorb them. Because of these misallocations, the objective
standard is not optimally effective in achieving the overall goal of cost
minimization in every case.
A. Theory
The objective standard's misallocation of duty would not matter if
attorneys and clients could bargain with one another to reallocate the
duty to investigate, and if such bargaining were costless. 170 The Coase
Theorem posits that when transaction costs are zero, the efficient out-
come will result through bargaining regardless of the legal rule.1 71
168. Since each dollar of investigation cost represents a higher portion of a small company's
revenues than it does of a large company's, a small company will have to risk a greater portion of
its resources to file a claim than a large company.
169. The objective standard may be doubly undesirable because large sophisticated clients
like Acme may be better able to deflect the cost of investigation by passing it on to customers than
small clients like PSP. For a discussion of cost spreading, see G. CALABRESi, supra note 106, ch. 4.
The marginal utility theory of money on which cost spreading arguments are based, however, has
been questioned by modern economists. See id. at 39-40 (questioning the notion that a one dollar
loss by 10,000 people is necessarily less painful than a $10,000 loss by one person). In addition,
Rule 11 may poison relations between attorneys and their clients and damage an attorney's reputa-
tion. See S. BURBANK, supra note 121, at 85-88.
170. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, supra note 132, at 12.
171. Id.
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In Business Guides the Supreme Court said that a client who signs
a filing assumes a nondelegable duty to conduct a reasonable investiga-
tion.17 2 To achieve Rule l1's goal of cost minimization, however, bar-
gaining between attorneys and clients through indemnification
agreements is desirable when the objective standard places a duty on a
client who is not the cheapest cost avoider.1 73 While sound policy may
prohibit an agreement that requires the client to indemnify the attor-
ney for Rule 11 sanctions,17 4 no similar justification exists for prevent-
ing attorneys from indemnifying their clients. In tort law parties
minimize costs and spread risk by insuring against liability.1 7 5 Clients
should be permitted to achieve essentially the same result by paying
their attorneys to indemnify them for possible sanctions.
The example of Local Family Painters illustrates the advantage of
such bargaining. During its peak season, the cost of closing LFP's shop
to have its senior painter inspect the bleachers is $275. LFP presumably
would be willing to pay up to $275 to have its attorney investigate the
paint. Since the lawyer's cost of investigation is the $200 expense for an
expert, the lawyer should be willing to perform the investigation for
some amount greater than $200. The attorney and client thus could
bargain to shift LFP's duty to investigate to the attorney for a price
between $200 and $275. 17 The result would be a lower investigation
172. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 931
(1991).
173. Cf. S. BURBANK, supra note 121, at 42 (noting that the reallocation of monetary sanc-
tions from lawyer to client may be desirable).
174. The main reason for preventing attorneys from contracting for indemnification from
clients is to protect unwary clients. In the typical attorney-client relationship the attorney directs
the litigation and an attorney might ignore her professional duties by pawning off her risk of sanc-
tions on an unwary client. See, e.g., Harb v. Gallagher, 131 F.R.D. 381, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stat-
ing that allowing an attorney to indemnify herself for Rule 11 violations "offends deeply" and is
"illegal and violative of the spirit, intent and purposes of Rule 11"). But see Note, supra note 38
(arguing that attorneys should be allowed to purchase insurance to cover the risk of incurring Rule
11 sanctions and that insurance can alleviate the chilling effect caused by the Rule). See also
Schaffer v. Chicago Police Officers, 120 F.R.D. 514, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (arguing that to allow
attorneys to recover sanctions from clients would negate Rule l's purpose of "interpos[ing] a
reasonable attorney's assessment of the merits of [a] dispute between a potential litigant and a
potential defendant").
175. See, e.g., Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 558, 573-81 (1985)
(discussing tort liability insurance).
176. "One of the basic tenets of economic efficiency theory is that, in the absence of transac-
tions costs, agreements between parties will produce greater economic efficiency than existed
before the agreement." Gross, Contractual Limitations on Attorney Malpractice Liability: An Ec-
onomic Approach 75 Ky. L.J. 793, 797-98 (1987). This example assumes bargaining is free, which
obviously is not the case in the real world. If it cost each party $25 to bargain with the other, the
range of prices acceptable to both parties for shifting the duty would be between $225 and $250. If
the combined bargaining costs were greater than the differential between the investigation costs,
no bargain would be made and LFP would perform the investigation. For example, if it cost each
party $50 to investigate, LFP would pay up to $225 to shift the duty but the attorney would accept
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cost-than that imposed by the Rule.
The market for clients is extremely competitive, and many attor-
neys must sell their services aggressively. 17 Permitting an attorney to
undertake a more complete factual investigation by agreeing to indem-
nify a client is equivalent to allowing the attorney to sell a package of
services to the client. 178 A client's payment to its attorney for indemnifi-
cation against possible sanctions simply represents bargaining for more
legal service. Such bargaining would aid Rule l1's goal of cost minimi-
zation by providing the flexibility that is difficult to achieve with any
legal rule.
B. Reality
While in theory attorney-client bargaining could remedy any misal-
location of duty caused by the application of the objective standard, in
reality such negotiation would be problematic. In the real world courts
cannot assume that bargaining between the attorney and client will al-
locate the duty to investigate to the cheapest cost avoider. Because the
attorney and client are presumably already in a contractual relation-
ship, the transactional costs of bargaining will be low. Effective bargain-
ing, however, requires full knowledge of the stakes of the bargain.
Clients, particularly those clients who are legally unsophisticated, will
seldom have the understanding of Rule 11 necessary to make them ef-
fective bargainers. As a result, bargaining for cost-minimizing duty allo-
cation will be rare, and the inefficient allocation of the objective
the duty for no less than $250.
The Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency is illustrative:
[I]f A values the wood carving at $5 and B at $12, so that at a sale price of $10 (indeed at any
price between $5 and $12) the transaction creates a total benefit of $7 (at a price of $10, for
example, A considers himself $5 better off and B considers himself $2 better off), then it is an
efficient transaction, provided that the harm (if any) done to third parties (minus any benefit
to them) does not exceed $7. The transaction would not be Pareto superior unless A and B
actually compensated the third parties for any harm suffered by them.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (3d ed. 1986). In the case of bargaining to allocate
Rule 11 investigation duty between attorney and client, the transaction is Pareto superior if the
sanctions imposed fully compensate for all the costs a frivolous claim creates. While the level of
sanctions is beyond the scope of this Note, it is clear that sanctions do serve to compensate-at
least partially-the third parties harmed by frivolous claims.
177. In 1989 attorneys spent $82 million on television advertising, 29% more than they spent
in 1978. Dahl, And Now, A Word from the Lawyers, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 19, 1991, at 25 (citing
a report from the Television Bureau of Advertising).
178. Legal specialists are allowed to charge their clients more than generalists for certain
services. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1), (7) (1983) (indicating, re-
spectively, the factors an attorney may consider in setting a fee include the skill required to per-
form the service, and the attorney's experience, reputation, and ability. The client may determine
the objective of the attorney's representation and scope of the services she provides. Id. Rule
1.2(c).
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standard will remain.
In the peeling bleacher paint case the objective standard would im-
pose an investigation cost of $300 on PSP, approximately $200 on LFP,
and $100 on Acme, while their lawyers could have performed the inves-
tigation for $200.179 It would be advantageous for PSP, and possibly for
LFP, to negotiate with its attorneys to indemnify it against sanctions
because it could probably obtain indemnification at a cost lower than
its cost of investigation. 180 This indemnification agreement would
achieve the goal of cost minimization.
Acme, however, is the only client in the example that could bargain
effectively with its attorneys. Large companies with in-house counsel
such as Acme are probably the only clients that are legally sophisti-
cated enough to bargain with their attorneys over the duty of investiga-
tion imposed by Rule 11. Ironically, large companies such as Acme may
be cheaper cost avoiders than their attorneys and therefore do not need
to bargain for indemnification. Clients such as PSP who need an indem-
nification agreement from their attorneys to minimize costs are unlikely
to have enough legal sophistication to bargain effectively for one.
Because of the lack of information among clients about Rule 11,
effective bargaining by clients with their attorneys is unlikely. Although
clients should be allowed to bargain for indemnity from their attorneys,
such a policy probably will not result in any appreciable movement to-
ward the goal of cost minimization.
VI. CLIENT SOPHISTICATION AND RULE 11 CASE LAW
An ad hoc approach that applies a different investigation duty to
each case may be preferable to a rigid application of the objective stan-
dard.181 This approach could minimize costs by imposing the correct
investigatory duty for each case-a cost of investigation high enough to
ensure adequate investigation but low enough so as not to chill valid
claims by similarly situated prospective litigants. A case-by-case analy-
sis of the appropriate investigatory duty would be costly to adminis-
ter,18 however, and would provide no guidance for prospective litigants.
The duty imposed in each case would be applied retrospectively, and
Rule 11 would have either too much or too little deterrent effect on
179. See supra subpart IV(A).
180. Id.
181. See W. LANDES & R POSNER, supra note 105, at 123 (noting that "[i]f the costs to the
courts of informing themselves about an individual's ability to avoid accidents were zero, they
would set a different due care level for each individual in every accident case").
182. See id. at 126 (stating that the costs of ascertaining each individual's due care level are
real costs).
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future litigants. 183
The Supreme Court's Business Guides decision rules out an ad hoc
standard for factual investigation."8 The Court adopted an objective
standard, but acknowledged that the standard may vary according to
the circumstances.185 The majority's "reasonableness under the circum-
stances" language, 1 6 while necessary to distinguish its test from a strict
objective standard, nonetheless is vague. The only certainty is that cli-
ents can no longer make an "empty head, pure heart" defense to
sanctions. 8 7
To apply the reasonableness standard efficiently and to minimize
costs effectively, courts need guidelines to determine when a particular
level of factual inquiry should be required. 8 An examination of the
range of attorney-client relationships and the types of factual claims
that have arisen in Rule 11 cases offers some criteria for identifying the
cheapest cost avoider in different cases.
In deciding on an objective reasonable inquiry standard in Busi-
ness Guides, the Supreme Court emphasized that Business Guides was
a "sophisticated corporate entity."18a9 Because of its sophistication, the
183. A case-by-case approach applies no clear standard. If courts imposed sizeable sanctions
frequently, but the standards for their imposition were unclear, the Rule would overdeter because
litigants would undertake more factual investigation than is efficient. If the standards were unclear
and courts imposed sanctions infrequently, the Rule would underdeter because the low risk of
sanctions would not induce the proper level of investigation. The latter scenario is analogous to
that under the 1938 version of Rule 11, which was not uniformly interpreted and was almost never
applied. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
184. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 933
(1991) (holding that the standard is an objective one).
185. In discussing the need for the objective standard to be applied flexibly, Justice
O'Connor said:
[T]he legal inquiry that can reasonably be expected from a party may vary from case to case.
Put another way, "what is objectively reasonable for a client may differ from what is objec-
tively reasonable for an attorney,"' 892 F.2d, at 810. The Advisory Committee was well aware
of this when it amended Rule 11. Thus, the certification standard, while "more stringent than
the original good-faith formula," is not inflexible. "The standard is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances" (emphasis added). Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 11, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 576.
Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933.
186. Id.
187. Cf. Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.) (noting that "[a]n empty head and
a pure heart is no defense," and "[tihe Rule requires counsel to read and consider before litigat-
ing"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); Note, supra note 9 (discussing the objective standard of
duty imposed on attorneys by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 and the Rule's goal of raising the
standard of the legal profession).
188. Cf. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 940 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Flaum, J., concurring) (stating that a de novo standard of appellate review is necessary to give
guidance and promote uniformity in Rule 11 cases even though the difference between a de novo
standard and an abuse of discretion standard is hazy).
189. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 932 (quoting the district court's opinion, 121 F.R.D. 402,
405); see also Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933 (agreeing with the district court's
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Court determined that Business Guides was in a better position than a
nonsophisticated client to investigate the facts. 19 0 Implicit in the notion
of "better positioning" was the conclusion that Business Guides was the
cheapest cost avoider in that case. 9' The more sophisticated the client
is, the more likely it is to be the cheapest cost avoider. Courts should
apply a higher standard of reasonableness when analyzing a sophisti-
cated client's duty to investigate the facts.
But what is sophistication? Sophistication clearly involves some
notion of a client's experience " and size. 193 There are, however, a vari-
ety of other indicators of sophistication.
A. Repeat Players
Probably the most important component of sophistication for Rule
11 purposes is whether the client is a repeat litigator. One of the funda-
mental premises of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 which imposed an
objective duty of reasonable investigation on attorneys was that lawyers
are by definition repeat litigators' 9' and therefore are in a position to
prevent frivolous claims. This use of Rule 11 to encourage those who
are in the best position to prevent frivolous claims should also inform a
court's analysis of client sophistication.
Courts generally have employed the repeat litigator criterion when
evaluating the reasonableness of the client's investigation. For example,
in CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp.195 the plaintiff
signed a complaint asserting ownership of the oil aboard a tanker
through consignment by an entity that claimed title. 96 The court found
that the bill of lading upon which CTC asserted its title was forged and
that a reasonable prefiling inquiry would have detected the forgery eas-
ily.19 7 The court imposed sanctions on CTC for frivolous interference
with a sixteen million dollar cargo of oil. 1' 8 In doing so, the court noted
characterization).
190. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 932.
191. See supra subpart Im(B)(2).
192. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933 (stressing Business Guide's experience with copyright
infringement actions).
193. Id. at 932 (noting the contrast between Business Guides and the defendant, "a one-man
company operating out of a garage" (quoting the district court's opinion, 121 F.R.D. 402, 405)).
194. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 937 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that applying
the certification provisions to attorneys preserves the objective of imposing obligations on those
who practice before the court).
195. 739 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
196. Id. at 967.
197. Id. at 969 (noting that "[a] simple reference to available maritime publications would
have revealed that [the ship] ... was approximately 700 miles into the Atlantic at the time plain-
tiff's bill of lading was allegedly executed").
198. Id. at 970 (characterizing CTC's actions as "manifestly frivolous").
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that CTC had experience with forged shipping documents and had
made a similar claim in another case a few months earlier.'" 9
Repeat litigators are not always large companies. In Portnoy v.
Wherehouse Entertainment Co.2 00 the plaintiff, an individual stock-
holder, filed a complaint alleging securities violations against the de-
fendant.20 1 Because minimal investigation would have revealed that the
defendant's stock was not traded on the date in question and that the
defendant was not subject to jurisdiction in the district, the court held
that Portnoy's prefiling investigation was inadequate.20 2 The plaintiff
was a frequent litigant,20 3 and had ignored the court's warnings that a
reasonable prefiling investigation was necessary, so the court imposed
sanctions of attorney's fees and costs on him.20 4
As these cases illustrate, repeat litigators may be large corporate
entities or individuals who file claims frequently.205 The underlying as-
sumption in all the repeat litigator cases is that the client is familiar
with the litigation process. These decisions also reflect a suspicion that
the client may be abusing the judicial process.206 Courts should hold
clients who are not frequent litigators to a lower standard than repeat
players.207
199. Id.
200. 120 F.R.D. 73 (N.D. IM. 1988).
201. Id. at 75. Portnoy alleged illegal short-swing profits by an insider and sought return of
the alleged profits to the corporation. Id.
202. Id. at 74.
203. Id. at 76 (citing another judge's observation that Portnoy "regularly delivered com-
plaints" to the Court).
204. Id. at 77. The sanctions of almost $6000 were to be divided equally between Portnoy
and his attorney. Id. at 75, 77.
205. Some courts have even used the repeat litigator criterion to expand the duty of clients
beyond the realm of mere factual investigation to include responsibility for the legality of their
claims. For example, in Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 784 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986), a plaintiff
sued for the thirteenth time to obtain judicial relief from the decisions of Chicago area medical
schools denying her admission. The court held that the plaintiff was liable for costs and attorney's
fees under Rule 11 because her present claim was barred by res judicata. Id. at 782; see also Holley
v. Guiffrida, 112 F.R.D. 172 (D.D.C. 1986) (sanctioning a plaintiff who participated in crafting
litigation strategy for bringing a second suit that was barred by res judicata and collateral estop-
pel). The distinction between factual and legal claims, however, is not always clear. See infra sub-
part VI (D).
206. See, e.g., Portnoy, 120 F.R.D. at 77 (noting that Portnoy ignored the warnings of the
court and for a second time failed to undertake an appropriate investigation prior to filing a
lawsuit).
207. Courts for the most part have held nonrepeat litigator clients to a lower standard. See,
e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (refraining from sanctioning
public school teachers for frivolous claims that the defendant profited from copying a teaching
manual they wrote).
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B. The Client's Role in the Attorney-Client Relationship
The client's role in filing the claim is a second indicator of sophisti-
cation.20 8 A client who makes most of the tactical decisions in the litiga-
tion, and who has the power to force the attorney to act more quickly or
less carefully than the attorney otherwise would, may be in a better
position to investigate than a client who allows the attorney to make all
important decisions. 09 Faced with the choice between performing a full
factual investigation and risking the loss of a large client, or performing
a more cursory factual investigation and risking sanctions, an attorney
may well choose the latter option. 10 While attorneys have an objective
duty to make a reasonable investigation of the facts, when clients can
apply pressure on attorneys, courts should impose the duty on the
clients to serve the cost minimization purpose of the Rule.211
In Holley v. Guiffrida2 12 the plaintiff, an individual, brought a sec-
ond action against government officials after an earlier action was un-
successful.1 Despite a warning that they risked a motion for Rule 11
sanctions, the plaintiff and his counsel persisted in pursuing a claim
that the court held was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. 4
Because the court had observed the plaintiff's active participation in
the suit and his close consultation with his attorney, the court sanc-
tioned the client and his attorney equally.
2 15
When the attorney is the decisionmaker in the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the attorney should bear primary responsibility for frivolous
208. See, e.g., Widell v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, No. 86-C9553, at *2 (N.D. Inl. Nov. 9,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (stating that "[t]he Rule does permit sanctions against a
client, however, but only where the client's direction is clearly related to the attorney's miscon-
duct"); see also Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1988) (remand-
ing for apportionment of sanctions among clients who played different roles in a lengthy action).
209. See, e.g., Widell at *3-4 (stating that "[i]mposing Rule 11 sanctions on a client is only
appropriate where it is clear that the client was acting as master of her attorney in a puppet-like
fashion").
210. See S. BURBANK, supra note 121, at 42 (noting that attorneys may fail to investigate
because they do not want to risk losing the client's business).
211. Placing a significant duty on the powerful client in these situations may deter frivolous
claims better. For example, an attorney faced with incurring a $5000 sanction or pleasing a client
that pays him $100,000 a year in legal fees may risk the sanction. If the client, however, faces a
choice between a minor investigation cost and a large sanction, the client will probably investigate
and avoid frivolous claims. In these situations, there is little concern about chilling legitimate liti-
gation because powerful clients generally will not be chilled by the cost of a reasonable investiga-
tion. See Miller, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that the escalating cost of litigation may place it
beyond the means of all but the wealthy and sturdy). Cf. S. BURBANK, supra note 121, at 42 (argu-
ing that when an attorney is afraid of losing a client's business, reallocation of the attorney's duty
to investigate to the client is highly desirable).
212. 112 F.R.D. 172 (D.D.C. 1986).
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claims.16 In Harb v. Gallagher1 7 the plaintiff, recently acquitted of
theft charges, brought an unsuccessful-and frivolous-wrongful dis-
charge action against his former employer in federal district court.218 At
the urging of his attorney, the plaintiff brought a similar action in state
court, which the defendant then removed to federal court.1 The plain-
tiff's claims were barred by res judicata, and the magistrate imposed
sanctions on both the plaintiff and his attorney.220 In expressing strong
misgivings about this result, however, the magistrate noted that the at-
torney should be solely liable because his "lay and untutored" client
relied on his advice in bringing the frivolous action.2
C. Client Expertise on the Facts of the Claim
A third indicator of client sophistication is whether the facts of the
claim are within the client's particular area of expertise. If the client is
factually sophisticated with respect to the claim, the client, as the
cheapest cost avoider, should have a relatively high duty to investi-
gate.2 22 If, on the other hand, the facts to be investigated are not within
the client's area of expertise, the attorney may be able to investigate
more cheaply.
223
216. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Continental Illinois Corp., 113
F.R.D. 637, 644 n.16 (N.D. IlM. 1987) (stating that if lawyers were willing "'hired guns,' acting
without attention to their professional responsibilities," lawyers should pay the whole sanction)
(citing Schwarzer, supra note 119, at 201-05). But see Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 120 F.R.D.
439, 445 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that although the plaintiff "relied entirely on the advice of its
attorneys," it was not absolved of responsibility).
217. 131 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
218. Id. at 383.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 390.
221. Id. at 390 n.8. It appears that the main reason the attorney was so aggressive in bringing
an action which was obviously barred by res judicata was that he had an agreement with the
plaintiff's mother that she would indemnify him for any Rule 11 sanctions awarded against him by
the court. Id. at 384. The court held that such an agreement was "illegal and violative of the spirit,
intent and purposes of Rule 11." Id. at 390. See supra Part V.
222. Cf. G. JOsEPH, supra note 108, at 118 (observing that courts necessarily adopt a sliding
scale approach to evaluate when counsel can rely exclusively on a client for facts). In the example
of the State U. bleachers, the facts were within Acme's particular area of expertise because it had
numerous experienced painters. See supra Part IV. Similarly, a legal specialist may be held to a
higher standard of care than a generalist. Sparks v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1987).
223. The student painters in the State U. bleacher example were not factually sophisticated
because they were not professional painters. See supra Part IV. The bleacher case, however,
presents an interesting dilemma: to what extent does an unsophisticated provider of products or
services assume the responsibility of knowing what the average provider in that industry knows?
In other words, is there an objective level of knowledge in the painting business that courts should
impute to all painters? In tort law those with superior learning and experience are held to a higher
standard of care than others in fields such as milk hauling, hockey coaching, and skiing. W. KEE-
TON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984). But the objective
standard of factual inquiry for the legal profession under Rule 11 imputes a minimum level of
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For example, in CTC Imports & Exports2 24 the court found that
CTC's experience with bills of lading, coupled with the fact that an in-
vestigator had informed CTC of the possibility of forgery, gave the cli-
ent expertise on the factual question of whether the title documents
were forged. 2 5 The court held that while an attorney cannot simply ac-
cept her client's account of the facts, the client was "primarily responsi-
ble" and also subject to sanctions.22 6 Similarly, in Portnoy227 the
plaintiff was an expert in the short-swing profit field 2 2 and had a duty
to investigate his securities claims diligently.
2 2 9
Client control of the facts is also an indicator of factual sophistica-
tion. Such control may have been a primary factor in the Business
Guides decision. The factual error in Business Guides' complaint was
due to a mistake it made in compiling its directories.2 11 Since the pro-
cess of placing seeds in directories was completely in its control, Busi-
ness Guides was factually sophisticated with respect to its allegations.
Thus, as the cheapest cost avoider, Business Guides had a duty to make
a simple inquiry into the facts.23 '
There is often a suspicion of bad faith when clients who have ex-
pertise in the facts raise factually frivolous claims.32 Whenever courts
have such suspicions, they sanction clients for inadequate factual inves-
tigation. 33 Even when there is no possibility of bad faith, however, the
professional competence to all attorneys. See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412,
419 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "the generalist acts at his peril if he brings a suit in a field or
forum with which he is unacquainted"). The difference is that in the legal field there are licensing
procedures and rules of professional conduct to aid courts in identifying minimum standards. Cf.
W. KEETON, supra, § 32, at 187 (discussing availability of minimum professional standards in the
medical profession). Such objective standards are not available in fields such as hockey coaching
and painting.
224. 739 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1990). See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
225. 739 F.Supp. at 969-70.
226. Id. at 971.
227. 120 F.R.D. 73 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
228. 120 F.R.D. at 76 (quoting the observation of another district court that "Portnoy [has]
established a cottage industry in the short-swing profit field").
229. Id. at 77.
230. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 926
(1991). See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
231. "This entire scenario could have been avoided if, prior to filing the suit, Business Guides
simply had spent an hour. . . and checked the accuracy of the purported seeds." 111 S. Ct. at 932
(quoting the district court opinion, 121 F.R.D. 402, 405).
232. See, e.g., Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 119 F.R.D. 685,
687 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (noting that "the Chief Magistrate doubted the good faith of the parties'
representations that the factual errors in the affidavit were attributable to coincidences").
233. See, e.g., City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (imposing
sanctions on the client city for filing a fraud claim that had no factual basis and for refusing to
withdraw the claim until sanctions motions were brought by defendant); Continental Air Lines,
Inc. v. Group Sys. Int'l Far East, Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (imposing sanctions on
a client for a frivolous motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when the facts were
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greater the client's expertise in the factual area of the claim, the
cheaper the investigation costs will be for that client.
D. Is the Claim Legal or Factual?
The distinction between a factual investigation and a legal one is
sometimes hazy.2 4 While Rule 11 requires an attorney to make a rea-
sonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of a claim,23 5 a client
should be responsible only for investigating the facts.2 's Courts some-
times tend to merge the factual inquiry into the legal inquiry, however,
and hold clients responsible for improper legal claims. 87 This is a dan-
gerous precedent because it goes beyond the scope of Rule 11 and may
chill legitimate claims by imposing a duty on clients that in many cases
is difficult to fulfill.
238
Courts should avoid merging the duties associated with factual and
legal investigations. Although an attorney occasionally may rely on a
client for the facts of a claim,2 9 an attorney cannot depend on the cli-
ent for the law.240 While some courts have expressed concern over the
different duties imposed by Rule 11 on clients represented by counsel
and pro se litigants, 2 1 a litigant who retains an attorney has the right
to expect that attorney to be responsible for sanctions arising from the
known by the client and the client's director was "less than candid" in his deposition).
234. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2458 (1990) (noting "the
difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues").
235. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
236. See, e.g., Untereiner, supra note 107, at 914-15 (suggesting that a rule of attorney liabil-
ity for legally frivolous claims will be most efficient).
237. See, e.g., Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986) (imposing sanctions on both an
attorney and a client for appealing a claim against a judge that was barred by judicial immunity);
Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1984) (imposing sanctions on an attorney and a
client for not investigating the qualifications of their expert witness).
238. For example, in Duncan the court's ruling imposed the duty on the client of knowing
what the expert witness's qualifications should be. 106 F.R.D. at 6. This knowledge could only
come through legal experience and knowledge of the rules of evidence. See FED. R Evm. 702-706.
239. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1278 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a plain-
tiff's story of violent arrest, coupled with his attorney's experience, provided a sufficient basis for
bringing a malicious prosecution claim that turned out to be frivolous), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987).
240. Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also In re
Disciplinary Action Against Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing that an attor-
ney should not have relied on his client's vice president for the law of federal jurisdiction even if
the vice president was a lawyer). Even if a legally sophisticated client urges her attorney to adopt a
legally frivolous position knowingly, the lawyer should bear the sanctions because the lawyer more
easily can avoid the costs the frivolous claim imposes. Untereiner, supra note 107, at 914 n.92.
241. See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 892 F.2d 802,
811 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[w]e fail to see why represented parties should be given the
benefit of a subjective bad faith standard whereas pro se litigants, who do not enjoy the aid of
counsel, are held to a higher objective standard"), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
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legal aspects of her claims. 2 The existence of a legal claim, or facts
intertwined with a legal claim, should signal a reviewing court that, in
the absence of bad faith, the investigation was beyond the client's level
of sophistication.
E. Subjective Indicators of Client Sophistication
In addition to these factors, courts should be alert to other indica-
tors of client sophistication or the lack thereof. An uneducated or men-
tally deficient client should be held to a lesser duty.23 Conversely, a
lack of factual sophistication on the part of the client's attorney could
make a client better situated to investigate.24 Courts, however, should
remember that the minimum duty to investigate is the same for all at-
torneys.24 5 Although the client's level of sophistication may be higher
when the client is an attorney,24 6 courts should avoid imposing legal du-
ties on clients even if they have legal knowledge. 7 Courts also should
hold clients to a lower standard of reasonableness if any other indicia or
circumstances suggest that a lower standard is necessary, such as when
the claims are attorney-driven.24 8
Even unsophisticated clients are subject to sanctions for bad faith
claims. Courts should not hesitate to impose sanctions on clients for
abusing the legal process purposefully.24 It is important, however, to
242. "Applying the certification requirements to those who appear on their own behalf pre-
serves the Rule's well-understood object of imposing obligations on those who practice before the
court. A pro se litigant in essence stands in the place of an attorney." Business Guides, 111 S. Ct.
at 937 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
243. See, e.g., Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1465 (2d Cir. 1988)
(applying the subjective good faith standard to a client who "was mentally ill and had engaged in
bizarre behavior unconnected to the litigation"), rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Mar-
vel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). Prisoners also should be held to a lesser duty. Cf.
Thomas v. Evans, 800 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 1989) (allowing a pro se prisoner the benefit of discov-
ery to locate and prepare materials), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 261 (1990).
244. Cf. Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying sanctions to a
prisoner but not to his court-appointed attorney for a bad faith civil rights action).
245. Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988).
246. See Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgement and Organizational
Representation, 64 IND. L.J. (1989), for a discussion of the growing importance of corporate in-
house counsel.
247. Cf. Pravic v. U.S. Industries-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (imposing sanc-
tions on an attorney who relied unreasonably on a memorandum prepared by counsel for a
codefendant).
248. For example, courts hold attorneys to a lower standard of reasonableness when they are
forced to file a complaint quickly, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2459 (1990),
and courts also should hold clients faced with similar time pressures to a lower standard.
249. See, e.g., Blue v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (imposing sanctions
on black civilian employees for a bad faith employment discrimination action against the Army),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Under the improper purpose prong of Rule 11, courts hold
clients to the same standard as attorneys. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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limit such sanctions to those who actually acted in bad faith in order to
avoid chilling legitimate claims.2 50 Furthermore, if a client misleads an
attorney on the facts, the client should be liable for sanctions regardless
of its lack of sophistication.
VII. A HYBRID APPROACH TO FACTUAL INQUIRY
In Business Guides the Supreme Court rejected the subjective good
faith standard that some courts had used and instituted an objective
approach for applying Rule 11 to clients in inadequate factual inquiry
cases. 2 52 The Court cautioned, however, that courts should hold clients
to a lower standard of reasonableness than attorneys.253 As this Note
shows, the standard must also be flexible from client to client and from
fact pattern to fact pattern because there will be different cheapest cost
avoiders in different situations.2 " Courts should use the indicators of
client sophistication discussed in this Note to determine who is the
cheapest cost avoider in a given case. 55
While courts should apply the objective standard flexibly, some
commentators have criticized the lack of uniformity in the application
of Rule 11.256 Some courts and commentators see uniformity as a very
important goal. 257 Rule 11, however, imposes a negligence-like stan-
dard;25 8 the standard of reasonable investigation varies from one client
to another just as the standard of duty for negligence varies.2 5 9 Some
courts have even questioned the desirability of uniformity as a goal.26 0
250. See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d Cir.
1977) (stating that "[b]ad faith is personal").
251. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Chicago Police Officers, 120 F.R.D. 514, 516 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
252. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922,
934-35 (1991). The Court rejected the subjective approach the Second Circuit adopted in Calloway
v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
253. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933 (noting that "what is objectively reasonable for a
client may differ from what is objectively reasonable for an attorney") (quoting the 9th Cir. opin-
ion, 892 F.2d 802, 810).
254. See supra Part IV.
255. See supra Part VI.
256. Untereiner, supra note 107, at 902. The lack of a clear standard has produced inconsis-
tent outcomes and an impression of arbitrariness. Id. at 902-03.
257. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 940 (Flaum, J.,
concurring) (7th Cir. 1989) (citing commentators); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that there is "no necessary subjective component to a proper rule 11 analysis,"
and that removing the subjective component will simplify the standard and reduce satellite litiga-
tion), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
258. See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988).
259. Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 932-33 (stating that what is reasonable depends on the circum-
stances and that Rule 11 creates duties just as tort law does).
260. See, e.g., id. at 934 (arguing that the effort to establish uniformity would "be wasteful
because every case would still be a little different from the last").
1204
1991] CLIENT'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 1205
Whether or not uniformity is desirable, however, frequent application
of Rule 11 is vital to achieve its cost minimization goal.2 61 For the Rule
to serve this function, some uniformity is needed to guide courts and
litigants.2 6
Since the indicators of client sophistication discussed in this Note
do not provide a foolproof way of deciding the appropriate standard of
duty in all cases, courts should have a default standard for cases in
which they cannot label a client sophisticated or unsophisticated. 26 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has rejected the subjective standard, but ad-
mits that its objective standard is somewhat flexible, the proper default
standard should be somewhere between a strict objective approach and
the subjective good faith approach. The appropriate default standard
thus combines the two approaches, requiring the level of investigation
that a reasonable person in the client's shoes would have undertaken
knowing that she faced sanctions for bringing a factually frivolous
claim.26 This hybrid standard will place the primary duty to investi-
gate on the cheapest cost avoider in the greatest number of cases.
Such a standard minimizes the objective standard's chilling effect, 66
but also is threatening enough to induce clients to make a reasonable
inquiry when they are better positioned than their attorneys to do so.
261. It is essential that Rule 11 remains threatening enough to encourage sufficient factual
investigation. See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 60, at 197-98 (discussing the "in terrorem" effect of Rule
11). But see S. BURBANK, supra note 121, at 39 (noting that one detrimental effect of availability of
attorney's fees as a sanction is that parties may attempt to recover attorney's fees through Rule 11
sanctions in many cases).
262. In addition, the administrative cost of setting a different standard for each individual
would be prohibitive. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 105, at 123-26.
263. Cf. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think, and Investigate, LmGATION,
Winter 1985, at 13, 14. The authors point out the need for some sort of uniform standard by
defining Rule 11's reasonable inquiry requirement for practicing attorneys:
In general, the phrase requires you to be careful, skeptical, objective, and a judicious
professional in all pleading and motion matters. On the other hand, your duty to your client
requires you to be daring, innovative, imaginative, and a fierce partisan. With these clear
guideposts you should have no problem-especially if you also know it when you see it.
Id.
264. Cf. Note, Divining an Approach to Attorney Sanctions and Iowa Rule 80(a) Through
an Analysis of Federal and State Civil Procedure Rules, 72 IowA L. Rav. 701, 713-14 (1987) (not-
ing that a type of hybrid approach has been used in many Rule 11 cases and proposing a similar
approach for Iowa Rule 80(a)). Courts have used such a hybrid standard in other areas when faced
with a choice between objective and subjective standards. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 321 (1975) (finding that the appropriate standard for qualified immunity "necessarily contains
elements of both" the objective and subjective good faith standards).
265. Cf. G. CALAB ESi, supra note 106, at 262 (suggesting that "in the absence of any indica-
tion that one party is a cheaper cost avoider than the other, an even split maximizes the chances of
allocating costs to the cheapest cost avoider").
266. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 940 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the chilling
effect of "an objective standard applied in hindsight by a federal judge").
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In Business Guides the Supreme Court attempted to settle the
confusion over the application of Rule 11 to represented clients in inad-
equate factual inquiry cases. The Court's objective standard of reasona-
ble factual inquiry at first glance seems to be a clear and uniform
standard. The language of the Business Guides decision, however, sug-
gests that even though the Court has chosen to reject the subjective
good faith test for clients, the new test is not objective in a strict sense.
As the Court admits, the objective standard must be flexible because
any determination of reasonableness is fact dependent. This Note has
attempted to demonstrate that too rigid an application of the objective
standard will result in a misallocation of the duty to investigate and
could be costly to society.
The district courts must determine what is a reasonable investiga-
tion in the multitude of factual patterns that may arise. Courts should
remember the need for flexibility and, in deciding particular cases,
should rule in ways that force future litigants to take seriously their
duty to investigate the facts of their claims before trial. At the same
time, however, courts should avoid applying Rule 11 in a manner that
will chill legitimate claims. While deterrence is often mentioned as the
primary purpose of Rule 11, this Note shows that the Rule's real goal is
cost avoidance. The optimal Rule 11 is not necessarily the one that de-
ters the most frivolous claims because such a Rule would impose its
own costs. Rather, courts should evaluate cases with an eye toward min-
imizing aggregate social costs. The most efficient Rule 11 is the one that
imposes a duty on the cheapest cost avoider in the greatest number of
cases.
Although the objective standard for clients misallocates the duty to
investigate by placing it on clients who are not the cheapest cost
avoiders in many cases, the objective standard could still achieve cost
minimization if clients could bargain costlessly with their attorneys for
indemnification from sanctions. Such bargaining is not possible, how-
ever, for the clients who would benefit most from indemnification be-
cause they generally lack the legal knowledge to bargain effectively.
Unsophisticated clients simply do not know about Rule 11 and their
duty of factual investigation under the Business Guides standard.
As this Note illustrates, a sophisticated client is more likely to be
the cheapest cost avoider. To determine client sophistication, courts
should look to factors such as whether clients are repeat litigators,
whether they have power to control their attorneys, their level of exper-
tise on the facts of their claims, their ability to spread the costs of in-
vestigation, the factual or legal nature of the claim, and other equitable
indicators of sophistication. When a client's sophistication level is not
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easily ascertainable, courts should take a hybrid approach to determine
a client's duty to investigate facts. By refraining from a rigid applica-
tion of the objective standard that would make clients strictly liable for
any factually frivolous claim, courts can place the duty to investigate
the facts on the cheapest cost avoider in the greatest number of cases.
James E. Ward IV

